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PROHIBITING BINDING ARBITRATION: THE PROPOSED
CHANGE IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 6
TERRI Jo KENNEDY
One of the recurring aphorisms used by the constitution revision
commissioners during debate was, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."
The proposals and debate on collective bargaining for public em-
ployees dealt with both parts of the caveat: is there a problem in
this area, and if there is, should it be solved in the constitution
rather than in the statutes?
I. HISTORY OF ARTICLE I, § 6
A brief look at the history of article I, § 6 of the Florida Constitu-
tion is necessary to answer these queries. In 1944 an amendment to
the 1885 Florida Constitution added these words to section 12 of the
declaration of rights:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or non-membership in any labor union, or
labor organization; provided, that this clause shall not be con-
strued to deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a
labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their
employer.'
This amendment was intended, and has been held, to prohibit
''closed shops" (where only union members can be employed) or
''agency shops" (where nonunion employees must pay union dues) .2
This "right to work" provision was generally hailed by representa-
tives of industry and denigrated by proponents of organized labor.
The 1968 revision of the constitution placed the "right to work"
provision in a separate section and revised it to read:
SECTION 6. Right to work.-The right of persons to work
shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-
membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of
employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collec-
1. Prior to the 1944 amendment, art. 1, § 12 simply read: "No person shall be subject to
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, nor compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken without just compensation."
2. Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962), aff'd,
375 U.S. 96 (1963).
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tively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not
have the right to strike.'
The 1968 commission would have added "public or private" to the
phrase granting the right to bargain collectively, but the legislature
deleted that phrase from the proposal which was finally approved
for the ballot.'
In 1969, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the term
"employees" in article I, section 6 of the state constitution included
persons in the public as well as the private sector.' Chief Justice
Ervin, with a footnote reference to the legislative journals during the
1968 revision process, summarily settled the question:
We hold that with the exception of the right to strike, public
employees have the same rights of collective bargaining as are
granted private employees by Section 6.
A delicate balance must be struck in order that there be no
denial of the guaranteed right of public employees to bargain
collectively with public employers without, however, in any way
trenching upon the prohibition against public employees striking
either directly or indirectly or using coercive or intimidating tac-
tics in the collective bargaining process.'
This interpretation was followed in 1972 by a warning from the
supreme court: if the legislature did not act within a reasonable
time to implement this constitutional right by statute, the court
would be forced to implement it by rule.7 The legislature chose to
avoid a direct confrontation between the legislative and judicial
branches and, in 1974, adopted the Public Employees Relations Act,
part II of chapter 447, Florida Statutes." The legislature revised the
statute substantially in 1977.1
II. THE 1977-78 REVISION PROCESS
When the new Constitution Revision Commission began its work,
the first question to surface in the labor area was whether there
should be collective bargaining in the public sector at all. Oppo-
3. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
4. D'Alemberte, Commentary, in 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 102 (West 1970).
5. Dade Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
6. Id. at 905-06 (footnote omitted).
7. Dade Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1972).
8. Ch. 74-100, 1974 Fla. Laws 134.
9. See ch. 77-343, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476.
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nents of collective bargaining, led by Associated Industries of Flor-
ida and the Florida School Boards Association, sought to have
collective bargaining prohibited for public employees. The Declara-
tion of Rights Committee'0 gave a favorable recommendation to
Proposal 110,"1 which would have changed article I, section 6 to
read:
Section 6. Right to work.-The right of persons to work shall not
be denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmember-
ship in any labor union or labor organization. The right of private
employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively shall not be denied or abridged. The legislature may by law
permit or forbid collective bargaining by public employees. If such
is permitted adequate provision shall be made to exempt all legis-
lative employees and all managerial and supervisory employees;
and to limit the scope of bargaining to terms and conditions of
employment. Public employees shall not have the right to strike.
Commissioner Jon Moyle moved that, as a second priority, the com-
mittee recommend that article I, section 6 not be changed. 12 The
committee rejected all other changes to the "right to work" provi-
sion. 13
10. The Declaration of Rights Committee was composed of six commissioners and one
alternate commissioner: Chairman LeRoy Collins, Vice Chairwoman Freddie Groomes, Com-
missioner Dempsey Barron, Commissioner Dexter Douglass, Commissioner Richard Moore,
II, Commissioner Jon Moyle, and Alternate Commissioner Charlotte Hubbard.
11. Fla. C.R.C., Declaration of Rights Committee Minutes 5 (Nov. 14, 1977). The itali-
cized portions represent suggested changes. The committee approved Proposal 110 by a three
to two vote. Chairman Collins and Commissioners Barron and R. Moore favored the proposal,
and Commissioners Groomes and Moyle opposed it.
12. Id.
13. The committee members present voted unanimously to reject Proposals 14, 15, and
16. Commissioners Barron and Douglass were not present for the vote. Id. at 5-6. For the text
of Proposal 14, see discussion infra. Proposal 15 would have changed the "right to work"
provision to read:
(a) The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right
of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not
be denied or abridged. Binding arbitration with respect to collective bargaining
between public employees and a public employer is prohibited, and public employ-
ees shall not have the right to strike.
(b) Any public employee who strikes against his public employer shall forfeit
all rights and benefits to which he is entitled in any public retirement system or
public pension plan, except for a return of his accumulated contributions, and shall
forfeit any tenure with respect to his employment. The forfeiture provided in this
subsection shall not be waived by any public officer, public body, political subdivi-
sion, or court. [Italicized portions represent suggested changes.]
Proposal 16 would have changed the "right to work" provision to read:
(a) The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
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Once the committee finished its work, the commission as a whole
turned to the labor issues. Commissioner Thomas H. Barkdull, Jr.,
a member of the 1968 commission, and Commissioner John De-
Grove suggested a prohibition of binding arbitration, Proposal 14.11
As originally recommended, Proposal 14 would have amended arti-
cle I, section 6 by adding the italicized words:
SECTION 6. Right to work.-The right of persons to work
shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-
membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of
employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively shall not be denied or abridged. Binding arbitration with
respect to collective bargaining between public employees and a
public employer is prohibited, and public employees shall not have
the right to strike.
Commissioner Barkdull first considered a ban on binding arbitra-
tion after hearing testimony from local government officials at pub-
lic hearings in Ft. Lauderdale and Ft. Myers in August, 1977.11 The
entire commission also dealt with other proposals in the labor field,
including removing the constitutional right of public employees to
bargain collectively, providing that striking public employees would
forfeit retirement benefits and tenure, and limiting the scope of
bargaining in the public sector."6
There are two kinds of binding arbitration. The first type is called
"binding interest arbitration" and is used in the contract negotia-
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right
of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not
be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike.
(b) Any public employee who strikes against his public employer shall forfeit
all rights and benefits to which he is entitled in any public retirement system or
public pension plan, except for a return of his accumulated contributions, and shall
forfeit any tenure with respect to his employment. The forfeiture provided in this
subsection shall not be waived by any public officer, public body, political subdivi-
sion, or court. [Italicized portions represent suggested changes.]
14. 15 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 238 (Dec. 9, 1977). Commissioner Barkdull is senior judge of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal. Commissioner DeGrove is director of the FAU-FIU Joint
Center for Environmental and Urban Problems.
15. Telephone conversation with Judge Barkdull (May 30, 1978).
16. Proposals 14, 15, 16, 96, and 110. The text of Proposal 96 would have changed the
"right to work" provision to read:
SECTION 6. Right to work.-.The right of persons to work shall not be denied
or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or
labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization,
to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not
have the right to strike. There shall be no binding arbitration in regard to any
matter concerning the collective bargaining process between public employees and
public employers. [Italicized portions represent suggested changes.]
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tion phase of collective bargaining. In states where this device is
authorized (most frequently in bargaining with police and fire-
fighters), one or both of the parties to bargaining can declare an
impasse if no agreement can be reached. Then neutral arbitrators
are appointed to hear the dispute. The arbitrator (or a majority of
the panel) then resolves the conflict, and the arbitrator's decision
is binding on both parties. For example, if salaries were in issue, the
decision on salary levels reached by the arbitrator would be binding
on both employer and employee: the employer would be required to
fund that salary level, and the employees would have to accept the
salary portion of their contract. Presently, Florida does not have
binding interest arbitration, and there has been no serious effort by
public employee unions to acquire statutory authority for it.
Currently in Florida, when parties in contract negotiation reach
an impasse, a special master (called a factfinder in many states) is
appointed and conducts a hearing. The master then recommends a
solution to the legislative body (the employer), which has final,
unfettered authority to accept, modify, or reject the report. Section
447.403(4)(d) of the Florida Statutes provides: "Thereafter the leg-
islative body shall take such action as it deems to be in the public
interest, including the interest of the public employees involved."' 7
The legislature serves as the legislative body for statewide bargain-
ing units such as those within the state university system. School
boards, county commissions, and city councils are examples of legis-
lative bodies for smaller bargaining units. Frequently in Florida the
legislative body has rejected the special master's recommendation.'"
Thus, Florida law provides for only an advisory report while states
using binding interest arbitration impose a mandatory decision by
an outside, neutral party.
The second type of binding arbitration is called "binding griev-
ance arbitration." This is currently authorized by section 447.401 of
the Florida Statutes.'9 It occurs during the contract administration
phase of the collective bargaining process. An individual or a group
of employees can file a grievance against the employer's application
of the terms of the contract. The final step of the grievance proce-
dure is final disposition by an impartial person (arbitrator) who is
17. (1977).
18. In 1975, 78% of all special masters' reports'in Florida were rejected by the employer
(the legislative body); in 1976, 84% were rejected; and in 1977, 75% were rejected. Florida
State University College of Law, Public Labor Law Research Project (as yet unpublished).
For further information, contact Professor William McHugh, Florida State University College
of Law.
19. (1977).
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mutually selected by the two parties. This type of arbitrator may
not alter any part of the contract, but his decision as to application
or interpretation of the contract is binding on both parties. For
example, an arbitrator could decide that homeroom duty is or is not
subject to a contract provision that teachers shall perform no more
than two hours per day of nonteaching duties. 0
Proposal 14, the Barkdull-DeGrove proposal, would prohibit
binding interest arbitration. It received seventeen ayes and fourteen
nays on the first vote.2 Nineteen affirmative votes were needed to
adopt a proposal, so it failed. However, a few minutes later a verifi-
cation of the vote was requested because one commissioner's vote
was incorrectly recorded. On the second vote, Proposal 14 was
adopted nineteen to thirteen."
Commissioner LeRoy Collins then offered Proposal 110, which
would have left to the legislature whether public employees should
be allowed to bargain collectively.23 Under this proposal, the legisla-
ture would also have been required to exempt legislative, manage-
rial, and supervisory employees from collective bargaining. Finally,
collective bargaining in the public sector would have been limited
constitutionally to "terms and conditions of employment" rather
than to the traditional "wages, hours, terms and conditions of em-
ployment." Although the Declaration of Rights Committee had rec-
ommended Proposal 110 favorably, it failed before the entire com-
mission by a vote of twenty-three to five.24
Commissioner Barkdull then presented Proposal 15, which would
have required forfeiture of retirement benefits (except for the em-
ployee's contributions) and tenure by any striking public em-
ployee. 25 This was defeated by a vote of twenty-eight to four. 2 Pro-
20. As originally suggested, Proposal 14 prohibited binding arbitration but did not specify
which type of binding arbitration. On December 9, 1977, Commissioners Barkdull and De-
Grove offered an amendment to clarify Proposal 14. The phrase "with respect to collective
bargaining" was deleted and replaced by the phrase "to resolve impasse in collective bargain-
ing negotiations concerning wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment." 15 Fla.
C.R.C. Jour. 238 (Dec. 9, 1977). The comments of commissioners demonstrate that this
change was meant to clarify that binding arbitration in contract administration, as author-
ized by statute, is not prohibited but rather only binding "interest" arbitration. Transcript
of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 40-41 (Dec. 9, 1977); Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 37-39,
47 (Jan. 9, 1978).
21. 15 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 238 (Dec. 9, 1977).
22. Id. at 239.
23. Commissioner Collins served as Governor of Florida from 1955 through 1960 and later
served as Under Secretary of Commerce in the Johnson Administration in Washington. He
was special master for the impasse proceedings between United Faculty of Florida and the
Board of Regents in 1977, the first such proceeding for a statewide bargaining unit.
24. 15 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 239 (Dec. 9, 1977).
25. For text of Proposal 15, see note 13 supra.
26. 15 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 239 (Dec. 9, 1977).
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posals 16 and 96 (similar to Proposals 15 and 14) were withdrawn
by the sponsors."
Three months later, the central question of whether public em-
ployee collective bargaining should be guaranteed by the state con-
stitution was revived by Commissioner Kenneth Plante. 21 He pro-
posed an amendment which would have changed the "right to
work" provision by prohibiting any collective bargaining by public
employees."9 The Plante amendment received eighteen votes, one
short of the requirement for passage.30 Although individual commis-
sioners changed their votes at various times, the Plante amendment
was never able to attract more than eighteen votes.
Thus, the commission left undisturbed public employees' right to
work and to bargain collectively. The major change endorsed by the
commission was the insertion of a constitutional prohibition against
binding arbitration in the contract negotiation phase of public em-
ployee collective bargaining.
III. IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Article I, section 6, as proposed by the Constitution Revision
Commission, would read as follows, with the italicized words reflect-
ing the suggested changes:
SECTION 6. Right to work.-The right of persons to work
shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-
membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of
employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively shall not be denied or abridged. Binding arbitration is pro-
hibited to resolve impasse in collective bargaining negotiations
concerning wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment
between public employees and a public employer. Public employ-
ees shall not have the right to strike."
27. 15 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 239 (Dec. 9, 1977). For the text of Proposals 16 and 96, see notes
13 and 16 respectively supra.
28. Commissioner Plante is a Republican state senator from Oviedo who has served his
central Florida district since 1967. He was also serving as minority leader of the senate during
the revision commission proceedings.
29. Commissioner Plante's amendment would have changed the "right to work" provision
to read:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right
of employees by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not
be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to collectively
bargain or strike. [Italicized portion represents suggested change.]
30. 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 527 (Mar. 7, 1978).
31. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 6 (May 11, 1978).
100919781
1010 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:1003
Should the voters of Florida adopt the main document proposed
by the Constitution Revision Commission, which includes the bind-
ing arbitration provision, several results would follow. The first-a
not inconsequential result-would be the end of any confusion as to
whether Florida's constitution was intended to grant public employ-
ees the right to bargain collectively. The record reflects that the
commission specifically rejected removing this constitutional grant
from the state's fundamental charter.12 While the court decisions,
the existence of the Public Employees Relations Act, and the fact
that bargaining is actually taking place throughout the state would
seem to have settled the question, opponents of collective bargain-
ing for public employees (notably local government employers) have
continued to assert that the court misinterpreted the 1968 constitu-
tion. This would no longer be possible under the proposed revision.
Second, Florida would become the first state to prohibit binding
interest arbitration in its constitution. Only three other states spe-
cifically authorize collective bargaining for public employees in
their constitutions.13 Only one state, Pennsylvania, speaks to bind-
ing interest arbitration in its constitution, and Pennsylvania au-
thorizes rather than prohibits it:
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation or any other provision of
the Constitution, the General Assembly may enact laws which
provide that the findings of panels or commissions, selected and
acting in accordance with law for the adjustment or settlement of
grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between police-
men and firemen and their public employers shall be binding upon
all parties and shall constitute a mandate to the head of the politi-
cal subdivision which is the employer, or to the appropriate officer
of the Commonwealth if the Commonwealth is the employer, with
respect to matters which can be remedied by administrative ac-
tion, and to the lawmaking body of such political subdivision or
of the Commonwealth, with respect to matters which require legis-
lative action, to take the action necessary to carry out such find-
ings."
Eighteen states currently have some form of statutory binding
interest arbitration. 35 State high courts have reacted to the proposal
32. See 27 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 527 (Mar. 7, 1978).
33. HAWAII CONST. art. XII, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 19; PA. CONST. art. III, § 31.
34. PA. CONST. art. I, § 31.
35. ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (for essential state workers, including policemen,
firefighters, correctional employees and hospital employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-472,
-473c, -474 (1977) (municipal employees); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West Supp. 1978) (all
public employees); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-890 (West Supp. 1978) (municipal transit em-
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in vastly different manners: some have found binding interest arbi-
tration constitutional," and some have determined it to be imper-
missible under the state constitution. 7 The proposed Florida Con-
stitution, if adopted, would foreclose such a challenge.
It can be expected that the arguments for and against binding
interest arbitration will follow those expressed during the commis-
sion debate. The major argument raised against binding interest
arbitration is that it takes fiscal decisionmaking out of the control
of elected officials and gives it to nonelected "outsiders," who are
not subject to the wrath of the voters. Commissioner Jan Platt, a
city councilwoman from Tampa, ably expressed this view:
An increasing number of jurisdictions have enacted compulsory
binding arbitration statutes for settling disputes in the public
employees collective bargaining process. This places in the hands
of private persons not answerable to the voters the ultimate au-
thority to set taxes, to force elected officials to reduce services or
reallocate spending priorities in the means they believe to be in the
best interest of the public. Thus, compulsory binding arbitration
usurps the legislative prerogative, diminishes accountability to
voters, and erodes the value of the voting franchise.
To disrupt this direct responsibility and relationship between
the electors and the elected would seriously cripple the ability of
the elected body to analyze and prioritize their community needs.
A third party would step into the process to substitute its judg-
ployees); MR. REv. STAT. tit. 26, § 965(4) Supp. 1978) (municipal employees and teachers),
§ 979-D(4) (Supp. 1978) (state employees); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 9 (West Supp.
1978) (police and firefighters); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.231-.244 (1978) (local police,
firefighters, and emergency service personnel); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.69(3) (West Supp.
1978) (essential public employees); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-801 to 838 (Cum. Supp. 1976)
(government employees); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.200 (1977) (local government employees);
N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1977) (local police and firefighters); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 243.742-.762 (1977) (police, firefighters, and guards at correctional facilities and
mental hospitals); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.4-.7 (police and firefighters), 1101.805
(correctional officers and court employees) (Purdon Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.1 to
.4-1 (firefighters, police, teachers, and municipal employees), 36-11-9 (state employees)
(Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-20a-7 to 9 (Supp. 1977) (firefighters); WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 41.56.450-.470 (1976) (uniformed personnel); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (West Supp. 1977)
(police and firefighters); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 27-10-105 (1977) (firefighters).
36. Dearborn Firefighters Union, Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 201 N.W.2d 650 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1972); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 332 N.E.2d 290 (N.Y. 1975); City of Warwick
v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969); State v. City of Laramie, 437
P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968). This list is indicative rather than exhaustive.
37. Greely Police Union v. City Council, 553 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1976); City of Sioux Falls v.
Sioux Falls Firefighters, Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35 (S.D. 1975); Salt Lake City v. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977). This list is indicative rather than
exhaustive.
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ment for that of the elected body. The control of the taxing author-
ity and the appropriations authority would effectively be trans-
ferred from the citizens to nonelected third-party arbitors. Public
control of the public purse could be transferred to the union control
in this process.
Public employment is a privilege conferred upon the employee
by the taxpaying public through their elected representatives.
Should tax levies get out of hand or [expenditures] beyond con-
trol, there is swift retribution at the polls. Expenditures mandated
by binding arbitors are responsible and answerable to no one. This
prohibition must be included in the constitution. 8
In contrast, persons favoring the use of binding interest arbitra-
tion in the public sector argue that it is a middle solution between
the advisory recommendation of a special master and a chaos-
producing strike by public employees. They believe that collective
bargaining will only work if both employers and employees feel the
process can resolve disputes fairly without strikes. Public employees
in Florida already are constitutionally prohibited from striking.
Therefore, it is argued that there should be an alternative giving
employees a more legitimate role than they now have. As it is, the
special master's report is only advisory. The final decision rests with
one party to the bargaining-the employer. Commissioner Yvonne
Burkholz, an officer of the public employee union FEA-United,
summed up this philosophy:
Up until a few months ago, really almost in the last month or
two, we have not had definitive decisions rendered by the courts
of this state in any area of collective bargaining. The process is
extremely new. The process is maturing. The process is just begin-
ning to become a way to maintain labor management harmony,
labor management peace-the goal of all of us-perhaps my goal
more than many of you in the State of Florida.
• . . And now we have this proposal before us which would pre-
clude one of the tools that might be used sometime in the future.3'
The other argument against prohibiting binding interest arbitra-
tion involves philosophical questions about what should and should
not be part of the state constitution. Many commission members
believed that the constitution should address only broad policy
questions and that specific implementation of those guidelines
38. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 59-60 (Dec. 9, 1977).
39. Id. at 66-67.
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should be left to statutes drawn by the legislature. They argued that
the commission could not foresee the progress of collective bargain-
ing for the next twenty years (when another revision commission
will be convened). Many states have begun to use binding interest
arbitration in some situations only after eight to ten years of a
factfinding system similar to Florida's. 0 However, this argument
failed to persuade a majority of the commissioners, as it failed most
other times it was used.
Thus, the proposal as approved by the commission would prohibit
two of the three conflict resolution mechanisms available in the
public sector: strikes and binding interest arbitration. Only the spe-
cial master's advisory report would remain available in Florida,
unless some new mechanism is devised in the years ahead. Leonard
Carson, chairman of the Florida Public Employees Relations Com-
mission, summed up the impact of the commission proposal:
Being realistic, employer-employee conflict can no more be elim-
inated than can crime or poverty. The conditions can be con-
trolled, however, so that the public interest in the orderly and
uninterrupted operations and functions of government can be as-
sured. The proposals cited [Proposals 14 and 96 on binding arbi-
tration] obviously eliminate the alternatives and place greater
pressure on effective implementation of the present impasse proce-
dures."
Should reliance on special masters' reports to the legislative body
prove inadequate in resolving conflicts between public labor and
public management in Florida in the next two decades, a constitu-
tional amendment would be necessary as a prerequisite to any form
of binding interest arbitration.2 Enough commissioners believed
40. Memorandum from Professor William F. McHugh, Florida State University College
of Law, to Talbot D'Alemberte, Constitution Revision Commission Chairman (Jan. 4, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
41. Letter from Leonard Carson, chairman of PERC, to Commissioner Yvonne Burkholz
(Dec. 7, 1977) (distributed to members of Constitution Revision Commission).
42. In his memorandum to Chairman D'Alemberte, Professor William F. McHugh out-
lined some of the forms of binding arbitration which could be used to resolve impasse in
contract negotiations:
Some states are currently experimenting on a limited basis with last best offer
interest arbitration issue by issue; while others are experimenting with last best
offer interest arbitration by package. These two approaches are designed to discour-
age the parties from over using [sic] arbitration and to encourage true bargaining
while at the same time prohibiting the right to strike. They also limit the arbitra-
tors' discretion to reduce encroachment upon the sovereign authority of public
officials, a major argument against interest arbitration. Still other states authorize
the parties to voluntarily agree to interest arbitration on such terms as they deem
appropriate, thus leaving the decision to local authorities.
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that binding interest arbitration is sufficiently threatening to the
orderly operation of government to recommend a prohibition in the
constitution rather than reliance on legislative action.
IV. CONCLUSION
Adoption of the proposal proscribing binding arbitration would
place Florida in a unique position among the several states. Those
who favor the proposal stress the need to preserve popular sover-
eignty by preserving the role of elected officials as the ultimate
decisionmakers in the bargaining process. Those who oppose the
proposal emphasize the need for allowing continued flexibility in the
legislative process in order to deal with public labor problems in the
years ahead. Extensive public debate on this proposal is needed and
can be expected.
Memorandum, supra note 40. Since all these mechanisms provide that the arbitrator's report
will be binding, they would be constitutionally impermissible in Florida.
